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Abstract
This paper shows that Investor-State Dispute Settlements (ISDS) makes multinational
firms more aggressive by increasing cost-reducing investments with the aim to enlarge the
potential compensation an ISDS provision may offer. While a larger investment reduces
the market distortion, it will also make potential compensations larger. Consequently,
potential compensations to a foreign investor do not imply a zero-sum game. ISDS may
decrease domestic welfare, in particular if the investment leads to the establishment of an
export platform, and we find that even global welfare may decline.
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1 Introduction
Foreign investors who undertake foreign direct investments (FDI) in a sovereign host
country may suffer from a holdup problem. The reason is that a host country can use
its sovereignty to appropriate part or all of the investment from the foreign investor. An
Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) is intended to protect foreign investors against
such opportunistic behavior and thus prevent the holdup problem. This behavior is often
linked to weak institutions and unstable democratic processes in a country. However, ISDS
provisions are to an increasing extent being considered for countries with both a stable
political environment and strong institutional quality. For example, the Comprehensive
Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between Canada and the EU includes an ISDS
provision, which was also meant to be the case for both the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).1 Furthermore,
approximately 19% of all ISDS cases have occurred within the European Union, where
legislation already offers strong protection for foreign investors.2 Interestingly, on March
6, 2018, the EU Court of Justice has decided that ISDS clauses are not compatible with
EU law.
This paper provides a formal economic framework for analyzing why multinational
firms lobby for an ISDS provision in countries that are well-functioning. We show that an
ISDS under monopoly increases a multinational firm’s cost-reducing investments, leading
to overinvestment, and ISDS also leads to higher expected profits due to the value of
expected compensations. Furthermore, an ISDS under monopoly may have a detrimental
effect on the host country’s welfare if the multinational firm sells a large part of its host
country production abroad. This is in particular the case for export platform FDI where
1TTIP was negotiated between the US and the EU, and TPP includes several Pacific rim countries,
among them the US, Canada, Australia and Japan, and was even meant to be ratified, but these agree-
ments will not come into force as the Trump administration prefers bilateral over multilateral agreements.
However, ISDS provisions are expected to be an integral part also of future agreements. In particular,
TPP came into force without the US (but also without ISDS provision).
2UNCTAD has a detailed data base on ISDS cases. See http://investmentpolicyhub.unctad.org/ISDS.
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most of the affiliate’s output is sold in other countries than the host country.3 Adding
local competition to the analysis shows that an ISDS provision may even exacerbate the
overinvestment problem by increasing the incentives for cost-reducing investment while
the effect on welfare remains ambiguous. All our results extend if the multinational firm
invests in product quality or better market reception of its products rather than in cost-
reducing technology.
Conflicts between multinational firms and host governments about the legality of policy
changes have increased in recent years, and the cumulative number of known ISDS cases
have risen from 51 in 2000 to 1,023 cases in 2020 based on UNCTAD data. Alongside the
increase in arbitrated disputes,4 there is growing concern over the nature of arbitration
claims by multinational firms against host states. One example is Philip Morris Interna-
tional’s (PIM) attempt to sue the Australian government for billions of dollars over the
introduction of plain packaging of cigarettes. After losing an initial battle in Australian
courts, PIM initiated an ISDS claim in 2011 to reverse Australia’s plain packaging laws,
which ban all branding of cigarette packets. In 2015, a three-member arbitrate tribunal
at the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled that PIM had no jurisdiction to bring the
case against Australia. This and similar cases have raised concerns over the democratic
legitimacy of ISDS provisions (see von Bogdandy and Venzke, 2014), and have lead to a
debate about national sovereignty in the presence of ISDS agreements. Frank and Wylie
(2015) provide a survey of the literature of the darker sides of ISDS provisions. Some of
the arguments they present are that ISDS courts are pro-investor biased, that they lack
democratic legitimacy, and that their rulings are unpredictable.
Our analysis is related to a small but expanding literature on ISDS provisions and
their effect on investment and welfare. Empirical findings are ambiguous on whether host
countries of foreign direct investment (FDI) become more attractive through bilateral
investment treaties and ISDS. Egger and Merlo (2012), for example, use data on German
3For example, Ito (2013) reports that the third country export ratio of US outward FDI ranges between
40 and 70% for small host countries.
4Several of these disputes concern the energy sector where multinational firms have made investments.
2
multinationals and find that bilateral investment treaties lead to an increase in the number
of multinational firms that are active in a particular host country, and that they have a
positive effect on the number of plants per firm, as well as on FDI stocks and fixed assets
per firm. At the same time, Berger et al (2011), using three-year averages of FDI flows
from 14 source countries to 83 (developing) host countries during the period 1978–2004,
find that the impact of ISDS provisions on FDI is unclear.
Theoretical contributions offer various insights. Papers by Aisbett et al (2010a) and
Aisbett et al (2010b) discuss efficient compensation rules for domestic and foreign firms,
including removing some well-defined policies from any potential compensation claim.5
Kohler and Stähler (2019) show that an ISDS provision may improve aggregate welfare
in the host country if the ISDS provision encourages entry. They also show, however, that
an ISDS provision can never achieve the first best. Stähler (2020) finds that an efficient
investor protection mechanism requires a multilateral framework provided by a suprana-
tional institution, and that any ISDS compensation from the government to the investor
must be based on the host country’s benefits and not on reductions in investor profits,
as is the normal practice. Horn and Tanger̊as (2016) show that specifying a threshold for
a regulatory shock and a respective compensation rule that depends on this threshold
can implement an optimal investment agreement. Janeba (2019) deals with the effect of
ISDS on regulatory chill, and he finds that this effect is ambiguous. Perhaps closest to
our study is Konrad (2017). He studies ISDS in markets with large investors and argues
that ’ideal’ ISDS provisions have both positive and negative effects. They can establish
a level playing field between domestic and foreign investors, but they can also magnify a
strategic overinvestment problem and thus lead to excessively permissive regulation.6
Our model sets itself apart from the literature by focusing on a national policy that
is evidence-based rather than opportunistic. While Konrad (2017) scrutinizes an ex post
5This literature is also related to papers on land takings; for the seminal paper, see Blume et al (1984).
6A government that loses an ISDS case must reverse its policy and pay compensations. Fear of losing
such cases may make a government reluctant to implement legislation, often referred to as regulatory
chill. Janeba (2019) shows that regulatory chill does not only occur under biased courts but may affect
national courts as well.
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efficient ISDS provision in an environment where governments may be opportunistic, we
consider an environment in which institutions are strong, but the ISDS provision may
nevertheless lead to compensation of an investor if the panel finds that policy has caused
“unjustified” harm.7 In our model, an ISDS agreement will always entail some positive
probability of ruling in favor of the investor irrespective of the existence of evidence-based
policies.
We exemplify the effects of ISDS by discussing a tax that aims to correct a negative
externality. Our analysis considers an ISDS agreement that is embedded into an environ-
ment of evidence-based regulatory policy equivalent to Pigouvian taxation. The tax is set
to correct for an externality whose size is known to all parties in period 1, but ex ante
unknown and stochastic for period 2. The government can commit to well-defined rules,
and this commitment can prevent ex post opportunistic behavior. Thus, it seems that
ISDS does not play any role in this environment. However, given that ISDS was intended
to be a cornerstone in both the TTIP and the TPP agreement, we discuss its role for
multinational behavior in the environment of a host country featuring strong institutions.
We employ a two-period model in which the multinational firm sets up a subsidiary in
the host country in the first period. In the second period, the multinational can make a
case and bring the issue to an ISDS panel if the subsidiary’s profits fall short of its previous
period level due to a tax change. In our model, the multinational has market power and
thus produces too little. The ISDS provision will affect firm behavior and should lead
to more production in both periods. However, we show that the combination of taxation
and ISDS leads to over-investment and ambiguous welfare effects under different scenarios
because the potential compensation will be larger with an increase in output.
In our model, the government acts fact-based, but the ISDS panel – made up of in-
7For example, Article 9.8 of the TPP draft (2016) specifies that “[n]o Party shall expropriate or
nationalize a covered investment either directly or indirectly through measures equivalent to expropriation
or nationalization (expropriation) except: (a) for a public purpose; (b) in a non-discriminatory manner;
(c) on payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation . . . ; and (d) in accordance with due
process of law.” Any profit reduction could be regarded as a measure equivalent to expropriation in this
context. In fact, this is just what Phillip Morris claimed in their case against the Australian government.
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ternational lawyers – may interpret the issue differently than the government. Herein lies
the uncertainty and worry among many about the lack of democratic legitimacy. Our
set-up can be seen as one in which the firm rather than the government is opportunistic
by testing the panel’s interpretation of the ISDS agreement. Our model uses a tax as
the modeling tool, but our findings would carry over to other policy measures as long as
profits are harmed.8
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the model, and
section 3 studies the effects of ISDS under monopoly. Section 4 adds a local competitor
to the analysis and section 5 concludes.
2 The basic model
We consider a two-period model in which the multinational firm enters and starts pro-
duction in the first period after the host government has set a tax to correct for neg-
ative externalities. Before the multinational firm starts production, it has to make an
entry investment that will determine its productivity in future periods. Let k(x) with
k(0) > 0, k′(·) > 0, k′′(·) ≥ 0 denote the entry cost where x is the size of the productivity-
enhancing investment. In particular, the size of x will determine the marginal production
cost c(x), c′(·) < 0, c′′(·) > 0. Thus, the entry decision of the multinational firm has two
dimensions: stay out or enter. If it enters, but does not invest in productivity, investment
cost is k(0), whereas if it invests in productivity, the cost of productivity enhancing in-
vestment is k(x)− k(0). In what follows, we will focus on entry, and we thus endogenize
the investment size but not the number of entrants. Note carefully that, for convenience,
we make the assumption of a productivity-enhancing investment; all our results do also
hold if the multinational firm invests in product quality or in better market reception for
its products.
8In this sense our model resembles the case referred to above about Phillip Morris suing the Australian
government over the introduction of plain packaging of cigarettes. The fact that Phillip Morris tested the
waters with this case shows that they expected a non-zero win probability.
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Ex ante, the intervention necessity to correct for the externality is unknown for the
second period. The externality is linearly related to production and denoted by θ. Its
size is known to both the investor and the host government in the first period and equal
to θ1. The second period realization is ex ante unknown and thus stochastic. Both the
multinational firm and the government know that θ will be drawn from a distribution
whose cdf is given by F (θ) such that F (θ) = 0, F (θ) = 1, 0 < θ < θ1 < θ < ∞, and the
pdf f(θ) = F ′(θ) exists for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
The multinational firm produces in this country to serve a specific market. Demand
conditions do not change over time and can be given by the inverse demand function
p(Q) with p′(Q) < 0 in the relevant range. In the basic model, where y denotes the
multinational firm output, the multinational firm is a monopolist such that y = Q holds.
The operating profit in each period is given by
π = p(y)y − c(x)y − ty, (1)
where t denotes a unit tax (and where we have suppressed subscripts denoting the period).
In each period, the subsidiary maximizes operating profit w.r.t. output y, leading to the
first-order condition9
πy = p(y
∗(t, x))− (c(x) + t) + py(y∗(t, x))y∗(t, x) = 0. (2)
In order to save on notation, we will use y∗ = y∗(t, x) or y∗1 = y




respectively, when considering different periods. The second-order condition warrants
πyy = 2p
′(·) + p′′(·)y∗ < 0. Since πyt = −1 and πyx = −c′(·) > 0, we find that y∗t < 0 and
y∗x > 0, as expected. Let π
∗ = (p(y∗) − (c(x) + t))y∗ denote the maximized profit of the
multinational firm. Due to the Envelope theorem, we have
9We assume an interior solution such that the tax will not be too large, that is, t < p(·)− c(·), but our
model could also accommodate prohibitive taxation leading to multinational inactivity, that is, y∗ = 0.
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π∗x = πx = −c′(·)y∗ > 0, (3)
π∗t = πt = −y∗ < 0
showing that operating profits increase with the productivity-enhancing investment and
decrease with the tax. Aggregate domestic welfare is denoted W = W1 + δW2, where












+ (t2 − θ2)y∗1 − Iq(π∗1 − π∗2).
Domestic welfare consists of three components: (i) consumer surplus, (ii) tax revenues
corrected by the effect of the externality, and (iii) the potential ISDS compensation to
be paid to the multinational firm, which materializes only in the second period. We let I
denote an indicator variable that is equal to zero if the tax rate is below its past level and
equal to one if its exceeds its previous level.10 Consumer surplus depends on whether the
relevant market of the multinational firm is outside the host country or not. In the first
case, α = 0; if the multinational firm produces for the host country only, α = 1. Assuming
homogeneous consumers across countries, 0 < α < 1 if the multinational firm produces
for an internationally integrated market, and α will measure the relative size of the host
country compared to the size of the international market.11
An innovation here is the role of potential compensations: If the subsidiary’s opera-
10If filing for ISDS has a legal cost for the investor, some range of potential inaction will result because
the expected compensation must be larger than the legal cost. We ignore this effect, as our results do not
change for the range of taxes for which the panel will become active. Janeba (2019) explicitly includes
legal costs.
11An alternative explanation for 0 < α < 1 is that the host government is less interested in consumer
surplus than in other welfare components.
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tion profit in period 2 falls short of its level in the previous period, denoted by π∗1, the
multinational firm can make a case and take it to an ISDS panel. This panel will rule in
favor of the multinational firm with probability q such that the expected compensation
is equal to q(π∗1 − π∗2). Since most ISDS provisions are not clear on how panels should
decide, except for the notion of equivalence to expropriation for which any kind of profit
reduction can qualify, we choose the simplest setup of a completely stochastic outcome,
as in Janeba (2019). Alternatively, we could make q dependent on θ2 such that q = ρµ(θ2)
where ρµ(θ2) ∈ [0, 1[. Then ρ is the degree of investor-friendliness, like in Janeba (2019),
and µ(θ2) with µ
′(·) ≤ 0 measures the extent to which the panel is influenced by evidence.
In what follows, our results do not change qualitatively if we do the comparative static
exercises w.r.t. ρ instead of q. Note carefully that our ISDS provision does not ensure
unchanged profits for the investor since there is a probability (1−q) that the investor will
not receive any compensation.
In order to determine how the tax is set, we have to distinguish between institutionally
weak and institutionally strong countries. In the case of an institutionally weak country,
the host government is not able to commit to well-defined regulatory rules, but may set
the tax at its discretion. Appendix A.1 discusses the incentives of an opportunistic gov-
ernment. However, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) involves
partner countries that do not tend to suffer from institutional weaknesses and political
uncertainty, and this is also true for the majority of countries that would have been
involved in the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) or in the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP). In these agreements, compensation is based on violation of
certain identified conditions. An ISDS agreement is similar in structure, but must clarify
the foundation of an evidence-based regulatory policy. First, we would expect it to be
independent of market conduct and firm characteristics. Second, it should follow scientific
evidence for the problem at hand. In our case, this is equivalent to Pigouvian taxation,
that is, t∗(θ) = θ. In this case, only the externality is taken into account, and any activity
that is causing this externality would be treated in the same way. We would expect that
an evidence-based policy would solve the holdup problem as regulation would follow strict
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rules that exclude opportunistic behavior. However, the recent design of ISDS provisions
provides an opportunity for firms to claim for compensation. The next section will show
that multinational firms may also benefit indirectly as the potential compensation allows
them to strategically increase their investment level.
3 The effect of ISDS
We will now scrutinize the investment behavior of the multinational firm and the im-
plications of ISDS for firm behavior and for domestic welfare. The government follows
an evidence-based policy so that t = θ in both periods. Importantly, any evidence-based
policy is stacking the decks in favor of ISDS: the government faces two distortions, an ex-
ternality and a distortion due to imperfect competition. The evidence-based policy would
maximize social welfare if there was no distortion in the product market. Thus, if ISDS
increases output, it will help reduce the market distortion, and by assumption we rule out
that a potentially more effective policy instrument may deal with this distortion. Thus,
our evidence-based policy focuses on one policy issue only.
With an evidence-based policy, the expected profit of the firm is given by
Ω = π∗(θ1, x) + δ
∫ θ
θ
π∗(θ, x)dF (θ) + δq
∫ θ
θ1
[π∗(θ1, x)− π∗(θ, x)] dF (θ)− k(x) (5)
= [1 + δq(1− F (θ1))] π∗(θ1, x) + δ
(∫ θ1
θ






Expression (5) takes into account the fact that the investment is effective over two peri-
ods; δ denotes the same discount factor as in the welfare function. Without ISDS, that
is, q = 0, the multinational firm’s profit will be equal to the first period operating profit
and the discounted expected second period operating profit, minus the investment cost. If
regulation is tightened, that is, if θ2 > θ1, ISDS gives the multinational firm the chance to
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receive a compensation. The second line of (5) shows that this works like a partial insur-
ance to secure the first period operating profit also in the second period. The multinational
firm will correctly anticipate these effects when determining its optimal investment level.
The first-order condition for x is given by












We are now able to develop our first main results that is summarized by:
Proposition 1. ISDS will increase both (i) the expected multinational firm profit and (ii)
the productivity-enhancing investment.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
We conclude that the benefits of ISDS for the multinational firm come from two sources,
the direct effect of a potential compensation, and an indirect effect through investment
that enhances the direct effect. ISDS leads to strategic over-investment: for q = 0, the
multinational firm, being a monopolist, would just balance the marginal benefit of the
production cost reduction and the marginal cost of cost-reducing investment. With an
increase in q, investment increases beyond cost minimization because the size of the in-
vestment also determines the potential compensation.
What about the effect of an ISDS provision on domestic welfare and global welfare?
We find:
Proposition 2. The effect of ISDS on domestic and global welfare is ambiguous. The
effect on domestic welfare is negative for a sufficiently small α, and the effect on global
welfare is unambiguously positive only for a small q.
Proof. See Appendix A.3
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Recall that α measures the relative size of the host country compared to the size of the
international market. If α = 0, the multinational firm sells its host country production
outside the host country. Proposition 2 shows that not only is the welfare effect negative for
α = 0, but small values of α may also lead to a reduction in welfare because the increase
in consumer surplus over the two periods may not be large enough to compensate the
expected compensation from an ISDS provision. The reason for the ambiguity in welfare
is that in period 1 the multinational overinvests due to the ISDS provision, which has a
positive welfare effect. However, in the second period the government may have to pay a
compensation. Since the firm has overinvested due to the ISDS provision, the size of the
compensation due to the overinvestment may result in lower domestic welfare.
What could be hoped for is a bilateral (or even multilateral) agreement in the sense
that a domestic investor in the foreign country would enjoy the same treatment. However,
this requires that bilateral FDI is balanced (to make each country better off) and that
multinationals mainly serve markets within the area of the agreement (as to increase the
aggregate α). Even if these conditions were fulfilled, it is not clear that global welfare would
increase because the investment distortion could be so large that it would overcompensate
the increase in global consumer welfare. Only if the ISDS provision is small, that is, if
q is small, global welfare might increase with ISDS as it corrects the market distortion.
However, the question is, why use an ISDS provision to correct for market failures, and
not a potentially more effective instrument?
4 Competition with a domestic firm
Now suppose that the multinational firm is not a monopolist in its new host country but
faces competition by a local firm. Both firms compete in the same market and face an
inverse demand function p(y+z) where y denotes the multinational output as before and z
is the output of the domestic firm. The empirical literature has shown that multinational
firms are larger and more productive than domestic firms (see for example Helpman et al,
2004, and Raff et al, 2012), and we therefore assume that the marginal production cost
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of the domestic firm is fixed and equal to γ such that γ > c(0). The multinational profit,
net of investment cost, is given by πy = (p(y + z) − c(x) − t)y, and the domestic profit
is given by πz = (p(y + z)− γ − t)z. Note here that we assume strict national treatment
rules so that the government cannot tax the domestic firm more favorably. This is in line
with practice in countries with strong institutions such as the wider European Economic
Area. The first-order conditions for both periods are given by
p(y∗∗(t, x) + z∗∗(t, x))− c(x)− t+ p′(y∗∗(t, x) + z∗∗(t, x))y∗∗(t, x) = 0, (7)
p(y∗∗(t, x) + z∗∗(t, x))− γ − t+ p′(y∗∗(t, x) + z∗∗(t, x))z∗∗(t, x) = 0, (8)
where y∗∗(t, x) and z∗∗(t, x) denote the optimal production levels of the multinational and
the domestic firm, respectively. As before, we save on notation by y∗∗ = y∗∗(t, x), z∗∗ =
z∗∗(t, x) and introduce time subscripts only if necessary. Let πy∗∗ and πz∗∗ denote the
maximized profit of the multinational and the domestic firm, respectively. We find that
our results are similar as in the case of a monopolistic multinational firm, with πy∗∗x
replacing π∗x, such that Proposition 1 holds also for the duopoly case:
Lemma 1. πy∗∗x > 0, π
y∗∗
xt < 0.
Proof. See Appendix A.4.
However, in the case of duopoly, a crucial difference is that the investment level is
already larger than the cost-minimizing investment without ISDS (q = 0). Since domestic
output decreases with cost-reducing multinational investment, the multinational firm can
gain market share and profit by strategic over-investment. While this effect is well known
from the strategic trade policy literature, we show here that this effect is exacerbated by
ISDS: an ISDS provision makes this investment even more strategic in nature and thus
even larger.
Note carefully that this result does not say anything about investment levels under
monopoly versus duopoly: investment is not strategically larger if it only balances the
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marginal benefit of cost reduction and the marginal cost of investment. When the multi-
national firm is a duopolist, the benefit of a cost reduction is smaller compared to the
case of a monopolist. Thus, another interesting question is whether a multinational firm’s
investment level will be smaller or larger when it faces a domestic rival. We observe
two opposing effects: (i) Due to competition, multinational output and profit are smaller
with a domestic rival, and this effect makes cost-reducing investment less profitable and
smaller. (ii) In a duopoly, the multinational firm is able to take market share away from
a domestic rival by increasing its cost-reducing investment. We find:
Proposition 3. If inverse demand is linear, that is, p = a − b(y + z), the cost-reducing
investment is larger under duopoly if
γ ≥ a+ 7c(0)− θ
8
.
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
Note that Proposition 3 develops only a sufficient condition; it may well be that the
cost-reducing investment is larger with a domestic rival even if γ is sufficiently large only
for some range of θ. In that case, the result will also depend on the cdf F (θ). In any case,
we observe that the condition is not too demanding, given that the empirical literature
emphasizes the strong productivity differences between domestic and multinational firms.





p(ξ)dξ − p(y∗1 + z∗1)(y∗1 + z∗1)
]




p(ξ)dξ − p(y∗ + z∗2)(y∗2 + z∗2)
]
+ πz∗∗2 + (t2 − θ2)(y∗2 + z∗2)
− Iq(π∗1 − π∗2),
where the difference from (4) is that the domestic firm profit is taken into account. Ap-
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pendix A.5 shows that Proposition 2 carries over qualitatively to the duopoly case: the
ISDS-induced increase in investment will raise domestic consumer surplus in both periods,
but will also erode domestic profits in both periods, and it may lead to a larger compen-
sation claim. The effect of ISDS on domestic welfare, therefore, is ambiguous also in the
presence of a local competitor.
An important feature of ISDS provisions is that they allow only foreign investors to sue
a host government and claim for compensation; a domestic investor does not have the this
right. In our context, the domestic firm will thus not be able to enjoy any compensation.
An interesting question is what happens if we allow the domestic firm to increase its
productivity through an investment as well. As ISDS is a privilege only for the foreign
investor, the outcome can be even worse for the domestic country. As shown above, ISDS
makes the foreign investor more aggressive in terms of its cost-reducing investment. In
our setup, investment levels are most likely to be strategic substitutes, that is, if foreign
investment goes up, domestic investment is likely to go down, as the residual market
for the domestic firm becomes smaller with a more aggressive foreign rival.12 If also the
domestic firm can influence its own productivity, ISDS will make the foreign firm not only
capture a larger market share, but also reduce the investment incentive of a domestic
investor.
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has studied ISDS provisions in the context of host countries with a strong
institutional environment. The production activity gives rise to an externality that is
internalized by Pigouvian taxation. A multinational firm can invest in cost-reducing tech-
nology in a host country and pays a unit tax. Why then do multinational firms have an
interest in an ISDS provision? First, ISDS may imply a compensation payment if the tax
12This can be easily seen by using the assumptions of Proposition 3 that lead to maximized profits
πi(xi, xj) = (a− 2ci(xi) + cj(xj))/9b− ki(xi) where the subscripts denote firm i or j respectively. Since
∂2πi(xi, xj)/∂xi∂xj = −2c′i(xi)c′j(xj)/9b < 0, ISDS will crowd-out domestic investment.
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rate rises. If the subsidiary’s profits fall short of its previous period level, the multinational
firm can make a case and bring the issue to an ISDS panel. A second effect is that the
ISDS provision makes the multinational firm more aggressive in the market place. We
have shown that an ISDS provision leads to over-investment under both monopoly and
duopoly and that the welfare effects of ISDS provisions are ambiguous. Competition can
even lead to more strategic over-investment as the multinational firm has an additional
incentive to take market share away from a local rival. If the investment establishes an
export platform such that the benefits from an increased multinational output are small
relative to the potential compensation and a potential reduction in domestic firm profit,
the domestic country may be worse off.
Already in October 2014, the Economist wrote: “If you wanted to convince the public
that international trade agreements are a way to let multinational companies get rich at
the expense of ordinary people, this is what you would do: give foreign firms a special
right to apply to a secretive tribunal of highly paid corporate lawyers for compensation
whenever a government passes a law to, say, discourage smoking, protect the environment
or prevent a nuclear catastrophe (The Economist, Investor-state dispute settlement. The
arbitration game, Oct 11th 2014).” Our model has shown why multinational firms have an
interest in ISDS provisions beyond the expected potential compensation, as ISDS allows
them to change the market game in their favor. We conclude that the public should be wary
of any agreement which includes ISDS provisions in countries with strong institutions, in
particular if most of FDI serves as an export platform investment.
Appendix
A.1 Opportunistic government
Not being able to commit to pre-defined regulatory rules allows the government to set
the tax in response to firm- and market-specific circumstances. The first-order condition
allows us to identify several tax incentives:
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The non-cooperative tax balances several incentives: first, the tax wants to correct for the
monopolistic distortion in the consumer market (see I), second, it shifts profits from the
multinational firm to the host country (see II), third, it aims to correct the externality
(see III) and, finally, taxation takes into account that an increase in the tax rate may lead
to a potentially successful compensation claim by the multinational firm. These effects,
except for ISDS effect IV, are well-known in the literature and may lead to a regulatory
chill (see Janeba, 2019).13
The government sets a high or low tax depending on the relative strength these effects. If
the profit-shifting incentive (II) is strong, the holdup problem materializes: the government
cannot commit to an evidence-based policy, and the multinational firm will anticipate this
behavior and may not invest in the first place, leading to the classic holdup problem.14
If the government cannot commit to pre-defined rules of regulation, Kohler and Stähler
(2016) have shown that an ISDS provision may increase aggregate welfare under certain
conditions. This can be seen from Wtq = Iπ
∗
t < 0: introducing ISDS, that is, changing
from q = 0 to q > 0, or tightening ISDS, that is, increasing q, will reduce the tax rate. If
the tax rate has been excessively high from a social perspective, an ISDS provision may
work as a disciplinary device to mitigate the holdup problem.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Due to the envelope theorem, dΩ/dq = Ωq, and differentiation yields
Ωq = δ
(






because π∗t = π
∗
θ < 0, and thus π
∗ is strictly decreasing in θ, making the second term in
(A.2) smaller than the first term. Further differentiation yields
Ωxq = δ
(








13The incentives to tax or subsidize a foreign monopolist have been discussed extensively in the strategic
trade policy literature; for an overview, see Brander (1995).
14For the seminal papers dealing with the holdup problem in taxation, see Bond and Samuelson (1986)
and Doyle and van Wijnbergen (1994).
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π∗xt(·) = πyx(·)y∗t + πxt(·) = −cx(·)y∗t (·)− y∗x(·) < 0, (A.4)
so π∗x is strictly decreasing in θ, making the second term in (A.3) smaller than the first
term.
A.3 Proof of Proposition 2
Ex ante, the realization of θ2 is unknown, and thus we have to consider aggregate domestic











[π∗1(θ1)− π∗2(y∗2(θ))] dF (θ)



































dF (θ) = [1− F (θ1)]π∗1x(θ1)−
∫ θ
θ1
π∗2x(θ)dF (θ) > 0,
and thus W2x(·) and therefore also dW/dq are ambiguous in sign. For a sufficiently small
α, dW/dq < 0. Let V = W (α = 1) + Ω denote global (world) welfare, that is, the sum of
consumer surplus across all countries and MNE profit, for which
dV
dq


















which is also ambiguous in sign and clearly positive only for a small q.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 1
Differentiation yields
πyyy = 2p
′(·) + p′′(·)y < 0, πzzz = 2p′(·) + p′′(·)z < 0,
πyyz = p
′(·) + p′′(·)y < 0, πzzy = p′(·) + p′′(·)z < 0,
where the sign of the last two derivatives assumes that both firms compete with strategic
substitutes. The (strictly positive) Jacobian is given by
det(J) = πyyyπ
z
zz − πyyzπzzy = p′(·) (3p′(·) + p′′(·)(y + z)) > 0.




> 0, z∗∗x = −
c′(·)πzzy
det(J)





















′(·)y∗∗z∗∗x − c′(·)y = −c′(·)y∗∗
4p′(·) + p′′(·)(y∗∗ + 2z∗∗)
3p′(·) + p′′(·)(y∗∗ + z∗∗)
> 0, (A.8)














′(·)z∗∗y∗∗x < 0. (A.9)












xt = −y∗x + p′(·)y∗t z∗x − c′(·)y∗t < 0.
A.5 Welfare in the duopoly case
Since t1 = θ1 and t2 = θ2, Proposition 2 carries over qualitatively to the duopoly case as
the change in domestic welfare is now ambiguous in both periods:




























The sign of both W1x(·) and W2x(·) is ambiguous as y∗x + z∗x is clearly positive and πz∗∗x is
clearly negative,15 as is the last ISDS-induced term in W2x(·).
A.6 Proof of Proposition 3
From (3), we have that π∗x = −c′(·)y∗, and (A.8) shows that πy∗∗x = −c′(·)y∗∗ 43 for p
′′(·) = 0.
For a given investment level x, πy∗∗x ≥ π∗x if
−c′(x)y∗∗4
3
≥ −c′(x)y∗ ⇔ y∗∗4
3
≥ y∗.












≥ y∗ ⇒ γ ≥ γ̃(x, θ) = a+ 7c(x)− θ
8
.
Since γ̃(x, θ) ≤ γ̃(0, θ), πy∗∗x ≥ π∗x for any x if γ ≥ (a+7c(0)−θ)/8, and thus the marginal
benefit from a cost-reducing investment is larger for any given x under duopoly, leading
to a higher investment level.
15See (A.7) and (A.9), respectively, in Appendix A.4.
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